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This paper explores Justus Grassmann’s ideas concerning the foundations of mathematics as devel-
oped between 1806 and 1827. It begins with a discussion of the didactic and philosophical contexts of
Grassmann’s work. This is followed by an exposition of his ideas on the foundations of geometry and of
his 1827 account of the foundations of mathematics. Particular attention is given to Grassmann’s con-
cept of construction (synthesis), which represents the basis of his entire thinking. C° 2000 Academic Press
Dieser Aufsatz untersucht Justus Grassmanns Ideen zu den Grundlagen der Mathematik, so wie sie
zwischen 1806 und 1827 von ihm entwickelt worden sind. Die Arbeit beginnt mit der Darstellung
des didaktischen und des philosophischen Kontextes seiner Werke. Anschließend werden Grassmanns
Ideen zu den Grundlagen der Geometrie und seine Behandlung der Grundlegung der Mathematik
von 1827 dargestellt. Besondere Aufmerksamkeit wird dem Grassmannschen Konstruktionsbegriff
(Synthese), welcher die Basis fu¨r sein gesamtes Denken bildet, gewidmet. C° 2000 Academic Press
AMS 1991 classification numbers: 01A55, 01A72, 03-03.
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The contributions considered in this paper belong to a tradition opened by Immanuel
Kant’s cunning distinction between what he called general and transcendental logic. Kant’s
discussion gave rise to a sequence of intense debates which were joined by, among others,
mathematicians, philosophers, and mathematics educators. For example, the philosopher
Leonard Nelson—whose position was appreciated by Hilbert and Bernays—argued in 1928
that Hilbert’s axiomatic method actually represented a late mathematical actualization of the
foundational ideas put forward in Kant’s critical philosophy.2 Despite Nelson’s interest in
1 This paper is the outcome of a wider research project concerning the development of the axiomatic method
during the 19th century. The project was financed by a DAAD (Deutscher Akademischer Austauschdienst) grant.
A short version of this paper was presented at ICM Berlin 1998. I thank Hans Bussmann, Michael Hoffmann,
Ivor Grattan-Guinness, Michael Otte, Gert Schubring, Falk Seeger, and the anonymous reviewers for valuable
comments on previous versions of this paper.
2 In his Kritische Philosophie und mathematische Axiomatik of 1928, Nelson describes Jakob Friedrich Fries
as the first to have developed the foundations of mathematics as an autonomous discipline: “Fries zeigt ..., daß auf
der von Kant entdeckten Tatsache des nicht-analytischen Charakters der mathematischen Erkenntnis die Existenz
einer eigenen, bis dahin vo¨llig unbekannten Wissenschaft beruht, na¨mlich der von ihm sogenannten ‘Philosophie
der Mathematik’. Und er stellt nicht nur das Programm dieser Wissenschaft auf, sondern er fu¨hrt dieses Programm
auch aus, indem er die neue Wissenschaft systematisch entwickelt, durch eine ¨Ubertragung der kritischen Methode
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the history of the axiomatic method (in Jakob Friedrich Fries’s contributions in particular),
his studies remained confined to the evolution of the axiomatic method in its relation to the
developments brought about by the emergence of non-Euclidean geometries and, most of
all, to Hilbert’s contributions.3 Nelson’s position suggests a close link between the powerful
development of the axiomatic method by the turn of the 20th century and the foundational
debates that intensified after 1790. One of the important contributors to the latter debates
was Justus Grassmann, the father of Hermann Grassmann. Justus Grassmann’s work is
significant to the historian both because it provides a picture of the preoccupation with the
foundations of mathematics during the first third of the 19th century and because of the
great influence that his foundational ideas had on the revolutionary mathematical ideas and
on the not yet fully understood foundational ideas exposed in the two editions of his son’s
Ausdehnungslehre.4
Justus Grassmann’s philosophical, mathematical, and didactic ideas rarely receive con-
sideration by historians. The international conference “150 Years of ‘Lineale Ausdehnungs-
lehre’: Hermann Grassmann’s Work and Impact,” held in Lieschow, Ru¨gen, 23–28 May,
1994, represents an important exception. Two of the papers presented at this conference
were devoted to the study of Justus Grassmann’s contributions. Erhard Scholz investigated
the connection between Justus Grassmann’s work on crystallography and Hermann Grass-
mann’s creation of the calculus of extension [39]. Marie-Luise Heuser studied the relation
between ideas belonging to various fields of the elder Grassmann’s mathematical work (his
work on crystallography in particular) and Friedrich Schelling’s Naturphilosophie [20].5
Both papers clearly revealed the central significance of the concept of construction or, to be
more precise, of intellectual construction, in Justus Grassmann’s work, yet neither under-
took a detailed investigation of his concept of construction or of its relation to his account
of generalization and the foundations of mathematics.
The most elaborate discussion of Justus Grassmann’s construction concept can be found
in a paper published in 1827, entitled “Ueber Begriff und Umfang der reinen Zahlenlehre.”
In this paper, he distinguished between two fundamental types of construction that can be
used in mathematics. He called them external or properly mathematical synthesis, and inter-
nal or, as I term it, logical synthesis. These concepts represent the basis of his definition of
mathematics; of his classification of what he takes as the three fundamental mathematical
disciplines (arithmetic, combinatorics, and geometry); of his geometry textbooks; of his
work on the classification of crystals; and, last but not least, of the epistemological founda-
tion of Hermann Grassmann’s philosophical conception as defended in the introduction to
the 1844 Ausdehnungslehre.
auf die Mathematik, und zwar auf deren sa¨mtliche Zweige, soweit sie damals u¨berhaupt bekannt waren. ... diese
‘kritische Mathematik’ oder ‘Philosophie der Mathematik’ ist nichts anderes als die dem modernen Mathematiker
wohl vertraute Axiomatik. Und so ist in der Tat Fries der wirkliche Begru¨nder der modernen mathematischen
Axiomatik” [29, 95–96].
3 Indeed, Nelson did not provide a detailed discussion of Fries’s ideas. For a recent assessment of Nelson’s
position on the relation between Kant and Hilbert’s foundations of mathematics, see [29].
4 Brief discussions of Hermann Grassmann’s complex foundational ideas can be found in [6; 7; 30; 41; 44]
and above all in [26].
5 Other texts briefly mentioning some aspects of Grassmann’s contribution are [4; 26].
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JUSTUS GRASSMANN’S LIFE AND WORK
Justus Grassmann was born in 1779 in Sinzlow. He completed secondary education in
Stettin (today Szczecin, Poland). Between 1799 and 1801, he studied theology in Halle.
In addition to theology, Grassmann also studied mathematics with Georg Simon Klu¨gel,
and mathematics as well as physics with Ludwig Wilhelm Gilbert (who was to become the
publisher of the Annalen der Physik). According to Heuser, at the time, Halle was under the
influence of Jena University, where Johann Gottlieb Fichte, Friedrich Schelling, and Georg
Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel were developing their ideas on Naturphilosophie, and this exerted
a great influence on Grassmann. Another influence came from the von Hindenburg school
of combinatorics that drew on Leibniz’s ideas of a characteristica universalis and of which
Klu¨gel was a promoter.
Grassmann passed the theology examination in 1802, and until 1806, he pursued a the-
ological career. In 1806, he was granted a position as mathematics teacher at the Stettin
Gymnasium. A very active man who taught 26 to 30 classes a week, Grassmann was also
engaged in constant activity aimed at improving the general level of education in Pom-
mern (in those days a province of the Prussian state). Grassmann worked until 1852, when,
plagued by weakness and disease caused by advancing age, he planned to retire. He died in
the fall of 1852.
Grassmann’s work focused on geometry, or, to be more precise, on the development
of what he regarded as a new discipline intended to mediate between natural science and
mathematics, namely, combinatorial geometry. Even his 1829 Krystallonomie is basically
a treatise of combinatorial geometry. His 1827 Zahlenlehre aside, Grassmann’s published
writings all have a similar structure. They begin with a short introduction in which the funda-
mental methodological (mathematical, didactic, and philosophical) ideas are emphasized.
This is followed by the mathematical and didactic exposition. Although methodological
issues played a decisive role in the development of his work, none of his writings gives
a systematic presentation of them. The 1827 Zahlenlehre is a partial exception to this.
There, he tried to articulate the basic tenets of his philosophy of mathematics. A discus-
sion of the Zahlenlehre will thus occupy a central position in this paper. On the whole,
however, Grassmann’s methodological ideas—those concerning his concept of construc-
tion in particular—can be best reconstructed by considering evidence scattered throughout
the previously mentioned works.
THE DIDACTIC CONTEXT OF GRASSMANN’S WORK: HUMBOLDT’S
EDUCATIONAL REFORM
Grassmann spent 46 years of his life working as a mathematics teacher. His teaching
career began only 4 years before the initiation in 1809 of the Humboldtian educational
reform, which was gradually implemented until 1840. Grassmann’s didactic ideas, as well
as his work as a teacher trainer and as a textbook author, were undoubtedly influenced by
and influenced the changes that took place in connection with Humboldt’s reform.
One of the fundamental outcomes of this reform was the shift from classical education,
with its emphasis on languages and theology, to a scientifically oriented education in which
mathematics teaching played a key role. As a result of the so-called Su¨vern curriculum
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(developed between 1810 and 1816),6 mathematics made up a total of 20% of the curriculum
with six mathematics classes per week for all six grade levels of the Gymnasium. Another
important characteristic of the Humboldtian reform was the reorientation in mathematics
teaching from the practically oriented mathematics—centered on elementary computation
techniques such as the rule of three and their application to practical problems—to theo-
retical or pure mathematics focused on such topics as elementary calculus and projective
geometry.7
The Humboldtian reform was a top-down process. The shift from an education domi-
nated by Latin, Greek, and calligraphy to one oriented toward scientific mathematics was
abrupt; the Prussian education system was not prepared for it. One difficulty resulted from
the absence of a professional staff of teachers capable of implementing the reform. In fact,
one of the outcomes of the Humboldtian reform was the professionalization of mathematics
teaching. When Grassmann began working at the Stettin Gymnasium, however, this pro-
fession was far from being well established. Schools faced a shortage of qualified teachers
[40], and this was not the only problem. It was unclear what pedagogical path should be
taken in teaching the various mathematical subjects. As Hans Niels Jahnke has noted, “Die
Vorstellungen, wie der Mathematikunterricht an den Schulen konkret aussehen sollte, waren
in den ersten Jahrzehnten des 19. Jahrhunderts vage und unentwickelt. Auch fu¨r das Lehren
und Lernen an den Universita¨ten gab es kaum detaillierte Konzeptionen, im Prinzip der
Einheit von Forschung und Lehre aber eine grundsa¨tzlich stimmige Idee” [23, 352].
At the university level, the idea of the unity between research and teaching could be
realized through the concept of the professor as researcher–teacher. By interacting with
researcher–teachers, students would come into contact with the concepts of the various
disciplines as used within the scientific community. At the same time, the professor would
confront the various difficulties, perspectives, and interests of the students, and would
be continuously stimulated to rework the knowledge taught and thus to use the student
perspective as a source of scientific progress. The university became a place of confrontation
and synthesis between the practice of, in particular, the scientific community and the practice
and interests of the rest of society.
The same approach was to be applied in primary and secondary education. There, how-
ever, the reformers faced problems resulting from the social division of labor, from the
activity patterns and psychology of young students of various backgrounds, from a short-
age of qualified teachers, and from the lack of a clear, pedagogical conception. Despite
all these difficulties, the Humboldtian reform had at least one general, clear, pedagogical
guideline: the strict rejection of the reduction of mathematics education to the transmission
of ready-made knowledge.
This guideline was inspired by Fichte’s radical constructivism, according to which knowl-
edge is not knowledge of something given absolutely in a world of platonic ideas, in the
world of sense experience as determined by external objects, or by a receptive external,
pure intuition. Rather, knowledge is knowledge of the self and can be reached only by free
and reflective “Selbstsetzung” and “Selbstta¨tigkeit.”
6 Friedrich Paulsen speaks of the Su¨vern curriculum as the “Konstitutionsakte des neuen Gymnasiums” [23,
342].
7 For a discussion of the multiple features and implications of the Humboldt reform for mathematics education,
see [23; 40].
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In a Kantian vein, Fichte held that knowledge is rooted in the free action of the subject, and
that by acting and reflecting on its actions the subject constructs knowledge by experiencing
itself.8 This position was reflected in many of the works written in connection with the reform
of mathematics education pursued in Humboldt’s time.9
THE PHILOSOPHICAL CONTEXT OF GRASSMANN’S WORK:
FROM KANT TO SCHELLING
As is well known, one of the fundamental ideas of Kant’s critical philosophy is that
although mathematics and philosophy are both a priori, philosophy is discursive, while
mathematics is constructive. To construct a concept means to exhibit the a priori intuition
corresponding to it. The outcome of construction in pure intuition is an object, that is,
a concretely given singular entity which is an embodiment of the schema of the concept
represented. There is no comparable representation for the concepts of philosophy [24, B
741–742]. In this way, in contrast to philosophy, mathematics appears to be based on two
distinct faculties: pure intuition and the intellect. Closely related to this is Kant’s distinction
between general logic (which disregards any relation of knowledge to its object and which
therefore deals with concepts alone) and transcendental logic (which is concerned with the
relation between concepts and the objects representing them as exhibited in pure intuition).
Mathematical knowledge has a double determination. On the one hand, since (like any
other knowledge) it is conceptual, it falls under general logic. On the other hand, concep-
tual knowledge is not sufficient for mathematics; it essentially relies on representations in
intuition.10
A good expression of the previously described tension between concept and intuition
in Kant’s work is provided by Klaus Volkert’s distinction between internal and external
icons. Following Charles S. Peirce and Kurt Reidemeister, Volkert argues that mathemati-
cal thinking depends on the use of signs, and this, in turn, implies that space (or the intuition
of space, as Kant would have termed it) plays a fundamental part in all thinking. Moreover,
rather than assuming the existence of a strict opposition between construing the abstract in
the concrete and construing the concrete in the abstract (and in this denying the presence
of an iconic moment in the latter case), one should recognize that the two processes are
complementary. According to Volkert, all mathematical signs have an iconic dimension. In
8 For a more detailed discussion of Fichte’s position and of its influence on the Humboldtian reform, see [23].
It is perhaps interesting to note in passing that Jahnke compares Fichte’s epistemology with that of Jean Piaget.
9 Johann Andreas Matthias (1761–1873), an influential teacher and teacher trainer, wrote that “diejenige
Gewandtheit im Denken sich aneignen, welche in den Stand setzt, aus sich selbst Erkenntnisse zu erzeugen,
sich selbst in der Wissenschaft weiter zu helfen, und dem klassischen Denker, welcher in seinem Werke ein ganzes
Gebiet oder einzelne Parthien desselben beleuchtet und mit neuen Forschungen erweitert, in seinen Schlu¨ssen
sichern Schrittes bis ans Ziel zu folgen” (as quoted in [23, 356]). Georg Wilhelm Bartholdy also emphasized the
role of construction in mathematics education in a double sense. As pointed out by Jahnke, in his 1810 report to
the wissenschaftliche Deputation Berlin, Bartholdy wrote that construction “bezeichnet sowohl die Fa¨higkeit zu
geometrischer Konstruktion als auch das Vermo¨gen einer rein geistigen Konstruktion abstrakter Zusammenha¨nge”
[23, 349]. As Janke noted, “Die Vorstellung einer freien Konstruktivita¨t, eines freien Bildes, wie wir sie bei Fichte
gesehen haben, dra¨ngt sich hier auf” [23, 350].
10 I cannot venture into a detailed discussion of Kant’s dualism between general and transcendental logic and
between analysis and synthesis here. In-depth discussions of this important theme can be found in [3; 11; 32; 42;
43].
HMAT 27 JUSTUS GRASSMANN’S CONTRIBUTIONS 9
the case of the diagrams of synthetic geometry, “Die Figur, die Marke des Zeichens, selbst
besitzt eine ra¨umliche Binnenstruktur, die wesentlich in die Ikonizita¨t eingeht” [43, 343].
The diagrams of Euclidean geometry are paradigmatic: space as a pure form determines
some of the characteristics of the diagrams, and this spatial input is reflected in geometric
conceptualization. This type of sign is thus called an internal icon, where “internal” refers
to the fact that according to this reading the icon is a picture of what is inherent in the
nature of space and not in thinking. On the contrary, in the case of a more abstract use of
signs (as in algebra or in logic), “Die auftretenden Marken (z.B. die Buchstaben) selber
haben ra¨umliche Binnenstrukturen, die aber vo¨llig irrelevant ... sind: die isolierten Marken
sind na¨mlich unwesentlich. Wesentlich hingegen ist ihre Beziehung zueinander: diese be-
sitzt ikonischen Charakter (die logische Struktur wird in eine ihr a¨hnliche—Reidemeister
spricht von Isomorphie—ra¨umliche abgebildet)” [43, 342]. Such sign aggregates are called
external icons, where “external” refers to the fact that the icon is a picture of a concept or
abstract relation, and therefore the iconic element is introduced from without the sign, as
a spatial entity. The tension between the two uses of intuition in mathematics thus can be
characterized as the tension between two manners of interpreting mathematical inscriptions
as internal or as external icons as described above. With this in mind, we can now consider
Schelling’s critique of Kant’s position.
The starting point of Schelling’s critique, and one of its central ideas, is his disapproval of
Kant’s methodological separation of mathematics and philosophy. Schelling claimed that
philosophy relies on construction just as much as mathematics does. This claim stemmed
from a different account of construction and has important implications for both philosophy
and mathematics.
Schelling presented one of his most interesting attacks on Kant’s position in a paper
published in 1802–1803 [37].11 There, after crediting Kant as the first to have grasped
the great significance of construction in mathematics [37, 203], Schelling tried to prove
that Kant’s distinction between mathematics and philosophy hid a logical flaw. Schelling’s
argument went like this. Kant’s claim that mathematics is constructive is linked with the
statement that mathematics regards the general in the particular. At the same time, Kant also
claimed that philosophy regards the particular in the general, which means that philosophy
is discursive and conceptually oriented. According to Schelling, a closer look at mathematics
reveals that, while in a sense geometry can be seen as regarding the general in the particular,
arithmetic and algebra (like philosophy) regard the particular in the general. Therefore, if, as
Kant claimed in the case of philosophy, a discipline that regards the particular in the general
must be discursive, then arithmetic and algebra must be discursive rather than constructive.
Thus, the radical rupture between the two ways of conceiving the relation between the
general and the particular assumed by Kant leads to a contradiction [37, 204–206].12
11 Schelling’s philosophy of mathematics has not received much attention in contemporary historical research,
although [23, 43–44 and 51–54; 34] should be mentioned. Neither of these works undertakes a detailed analysis
of the implications of the contrast between Kant’s and Schelling’s ideas for mathematics, however.
12 As far as mathematics is concerned, the debate between Schelling and Kant involved the understanding of
and relation between the ostensive constructions of geometry, the constructions of arithmetic, and the symbolic
constructions of algebra. The account of symbolic construction given in Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason is brief,
and it has remained controversial (for a good discussion, see, for instance, [42]). In any case, Kant’s well-known
letters to Johann Schultz and to Rehberg prove that he was not unaware of the difficulties involved here. Schelling
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Schelling’s argument depended on the assumption that, like philosophy, arithmetic and
algebra regard the particular in the general. He defended this idea briefly by contrasting
the way in which signs are used in geometry and in arithmetic and how they are used
in algebra. According to Schelling, Euclidean geometry deals with sensibly given, ideal
geometric objects. A geometric diagram was for Schelling a “picture of an object [Bild
eines Objekts],” or, in Volkert’s terms, an internal icon. In contrast to geometry, arithmetic
and algebra are relational; there are no genuinely arithmetical and algebraic objects. The
strings of signs used in arithmetic and algebra are not pictures of any objects. They express
abstract relations. For Volkert, this amounts to saying that arithmetic and algebra rely on
external rather than on internal icons.
Schelling conceived thus of a relational discipline as one that regards the particular in the
general. Moreover, by accepting (i) the sharp distinction between construing the general in
the particular and construing the particular in the general and (ii) the thesis that philosophy is
discursive rather than constructive, the conclusion that mathematics as a whole is discursive
follows. Indeed, as Schelling pointed out, if Leibniz’s project of developing a universal
characteristic were accomplished, then all of mathematics would become relational; that
is, according to Schelling’s reading of Kant, it would regard the particular in the general
and so would appear discursive.13
Schelling, however, was not prepared to accept this conclusion because, like Kant, he
believed that mathematics is constructive. He thus had to overcome the sharp rupture be-
tween the two ways of relating the general to the particular as well as Kant’s accompanying
account of intuition and construction that go with it. In Schelling’s view, there is no opposi-
tion between the general and the particular in mathematics (or in philosophy); rather there
is unity and complementarity:
Es erhellt eben hieraus auch, daß alle Gegensa¨tze, welche durch die Antithese des Allgemeinen und
Besonderen mo¨glich sind, in die Mathematik selbst fallen, daß Philosophie in keiner Entgegensetzung
mit der Mathematik sei und daß, wenn in dieser sich die Konstruktion nach zwei Seiten teilt, sie in jener
im absoluten Indifferenzpunkt sei oder, bestimmter, daß, wenn jene notwendig entweder Darstellung
des Allgemeinen im Besonderen oder die Darstellung des Besonderen im Allgemeinen ist, diese weder
das eine noch das andere, sondern Darstellung der Einheit in absoluter Indifferenz ist, welche in der
Mathematik getrennt erscheinen. ... In diesem Sinn ist aber das Allgemeine als Einheit des Allgemeinen
thought that Kant’s position implied a sharp separation between the constructions of geometry, on the one hand,
and those of arithmetic and algebra, on the other. I think that Schelling’s interpretation is comparable to that given
more recently by Friedman in [11] (alternative interpretations were provided, for instance, by Brittan in [3] and
Shabel in [42]). Schelling wanted to eliminate this separation. As we shall see, despite his debt to Schelling’s
account of construction, Justus Grassmann distinguished between algebra, on the one hand, and the other individual
mathematical disciplines, on the other. He was thus closer to Kant than to Schelling.
13 As Schelling explained, “Wollte man ... dem Geometer den Vorteil zugestehen, daß er außer dem Bild, das
seine Aufmerksamkeit leitet, zugleich ein Zeichen habe, das seine an sich fließende Handlung fixiert, wodurch er
die Fehler seiner Schlußfolge sogleich entdecken kann, so wird erstens ... dieser Vorteil in dem andern Zweige
der Mathematik betra¨chtlich vermindert, indem es da kein Bild des Objekts, sondern nur ein Zeichen gibt, und
Verha¨ltnisse von Gro¨ßen und in der Algebra sogar nur Verha¨ltnisse von Verha¨ltnissen betrachtet werden; andrerseits
ist zu erwarten, ob nicht außer speziellen symbolischen und charakteristischen Darstellung der Mathematik die
universelle Symbolik oder Charakteristik erfunden und so die Idee, welche Leibniz schon hegte, realisirt werde:
Daß einige Schritte schon geschehen sind, welche die Mo¨glichkeit einer solchen Erfindung beweisen, ließe sich
leicht zeigen” [37, 204–205]. Here, Schelling clearly underlined the role of external icons not just in geometry
but in mathematics as a whole.
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und Besonderen fu¨r sich schon Gegenstand von Anschauung, versteht sich rein intellektueller als Idee
... . [37, 206–207]
Schelling tried to overcome the sharp separation between concept and object by claiming
that what is constructed in intellectual intuition is neither a concept nor an object but an “idea
[Idee].” In the idea, the particular and the general are unified, and this unity is represented
in the product of the constructive activity of the mind [37, 209, ff.]. This unity between
the general and the particular is characteristic of Schelling’s monism. According to Kurt
Radbruch:
Bei Kant leistet die Konstruktion in der Mathematik die entscheidende Vermittlung zwischen
Besonderem und Allgemeinem. Bei Schelling entfa¨llt eine solche Vermittlung; stattdessen steht hier die
Konstruktion fu¨r die Einheit von Besonderem und Allgemeinem. ... Als Folge der Einheit von mathe-
matischer Erkenntnis und mathematischem Gegenstand realisiert die Konstruktion somit die Einheit von
Form und Wesen. ... Bei Kant vermittelt die Konstruktion zwischen Besonderem und Allgemeinem, bei
Schelling realisiert die Konstruktion die Einheit von Besonderem und Allgemeinem. [34, 64]
As far as construction is concerned, the difference between the positions of Kant and
Schelling has its roots (i) in their differing accounts of the relation between pure intuition
and concept, and (ii) in Kant’s rejection of intellectual intuition and hypostatic abstraction.
As Manfred Durner noted:
Fu¨r Kant ist ‘intellektuelle Anschauung’ ein Grenzbegriff des Denkens, na¨mlich der Begriff einer
Anschauung, die nicht auf Rezeptivita¨t, d.h. auf sinnlichen Eindru¨cken beruht, sondern spontan und
selbsta¨ndig ist. ‘Intellektuelle Anschauung’ wa¨re deshalb nach Kant nur einem go¨ttlichen Verstand
zuzuschreiben, ‘der nicht gegebene Gegensta¨nde sich vorstellt, sondern durch dessen Vorstellung die
Gegensta¨nde zugleich hervorgebracht wu¨rden.’ Die Mo¨glichkeit einer solchen ‘intellektuellen Anschau-
ung’ kann jedoch vom Menschen ... nicht eingesehen werden. [9, 65]
In addition to this shift from Kant’s intuition/concept dualism to the concept of intellectual
intuition, Schelling, like Kant, distinguished between an internal intuition (intuition of time,
which is free and infinite) and an external intuition (intuition of space, constraining, finite,
shape-giving), which are seen as the two components of intellectual intuition. Schelling
regarded internal intuition or intellectual intuition as absolutely free and subjective. Because
of this, it runs the risk of arbitrariness and error. This is prevented by the objectification
of what has been framed in internal intuition in a concrete object (a product), which is
open to observation and experiment. It is, however, important to note that, contrary to Kant,
Schelling did not believe that either inner or outer intuition determines any particular set
of mathematical axioms or postulates. In Volkert’s terms, such a product is precisely an
external icon; Schelling spoke of “a¨sthetische Anschauung” as the “objektiv gewordene
intellektuelle” [9, 68]. “In der Kunst—genauer: im ku¨nstlerischen Schaffen— manifestiert
sich eine untrennbare Einheit von bewußtloser und bewußter Ta¨tigkeit, im Kunstwerk wird
die absolute Identita¨t des subjektiven und objektiven Subjekt-Objekts, der Freiheit und der
Notwendigkeit, zur sichtbaren Darstellung gebracht” [9, 68–69].
The previous discussion gives an idea of the way in which Schelling used intellectual intu-
ition to move away from what he regarded as Kant’s radical separation of pure intuition and
concept and of mathematics and philosophy. There is a fine point to be made here, however.
Schelling stressed the freedom of internal intuition, which is a fundamental element of his
account of intellectual intuition. He also qualified internal intuition as infinite (in contrast to
external intuition, which is finite). This must not be interpreted as a complete rupture with
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Kant’s position. Indeed, although Schelling admitted the capacity of the mind to produce
new ideas, this possibility is restricted due to the requirement of materializing them, or as
Schelling often wrote, due to the requirement of providing a finite materialization of the ideas
framed by the mind. Thus, the human mind is not seen as capable of developing and grasping
its ideas in complete freedom. This process is constantly interrupted because of the require-
ments of representation; only by observing its own products in a materialized form can the
mind become aware of its ideas. The essential feature of this is that thinking is thus recursive,
and in a sense, we do not have full, purely conceptual access to our thoughts. In this way, a
shift takes place in the direction of understanding thinking as an activity of sign production.
Sign production becomes a tool needed in understanding both the world and our own think-
ing. This represents an externalist shift in understanding thinking which has its roots in Kant,
and which, as we shall see, is essential for Justus Grassmann’s conception of mathematics.
Schelling’s critique of Kant did not stop here. In a subsequent passage, he addressed
Kant’s claim that the rigor characteristic of mathematical thinking is determined by the fact
that mathematics is the only discipline to have definitions, axioms, and proofs. Schelling
countered this with the claim that axioms cannot be distinguished from propositions. Indeed,
axioms
stellen nur die abgebrochene Demonstration vor, die weiter zuru¨ckverfolgt u¨ber das besondere Gebiet der
Mathematik in das allgemeine hineinfu¨hren wu¨rde, wie z.B. das mathematische Axiom, daß, was einem
und demselben gleich ist, untereinander gleich ist, in der Philosophie aus der Natur des Syllogismus
konstruiert wird. Wenn u¨brigens Kant Axiome als solche fu¨r etwas der Mathematik ganz Eigentu¨mliches
ha¨lt, so scheint er u¨bersehen zu haben, daß es auch in dieser Wissenschaft analytische Ko¨pfe gibt, die diese
Axiome, z.B. das eben angefu¨hrte, noch fu¨r beweisbar halten und wirklich zu beweisen unternehmen ... .
[37, 213]
Schelling held the rather modern idea that in mathematics there cannot be any fundamen-
tal distinction between axioms and theorems (in terms of intuitive evidence, for instance).
Moreover, like Leibniz before him, Schelling insisted that mathematical axioms should
be proved (in mathematics itself or in philosophy; on this point Schelling is not entirely
clear) and that therefore the axiomatic method points to the limits of available mathemat-
ical knowledge rather than to absolute standards of rigor. Axioms belong much more in
empirical disciplines such as physics than in pure disciplines like mathematics [37, 211].
In a subsequent passage, Schelling added that “die Linie des Geometers ist eben deswegen
Postulat, weil und inwiefern er sie nicht konstruiert. Postulieren ist Verzichttun auf Konstru-
ieren” [37, 216]. Concerning proof, he also noted that all geometric proof can be expressed
in terms of construction in external intuition, and geometric construction can be reduced
to moving the point [37, 212]. This is a process in which “das Identische und Synthetische
eins ist, oder allgemeine Zuru¨ckfu¨hrung der Synthesis auf die reine Identita¨t des Denkens
u¨berhaupt ist” [37, 212 ff.].
The previous discussion has several important implications, two of which must be em-
phasized with particular care. First, it must be noted that Schelling’s position suggests the
need sharply to segregate the constructive and the axiomatic approaches to mathematics.
Second, Schelling criticized Kant’s account of construction and pointed out, against Kant,
that arithmetical and algebraic constructions rather than geometric constructions are the
ones that should be taken as paradigmatic for mathematics. This idea is also expressed in
the following remarkable passage:
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Allein—nichts ist, was nicht der Zahl fa¨hig wa¨re, sagt Leibniz schon, und in diesen wenigen Worten lag
der Keim seiner Erfindung der ho¨hern Analysis. Denn was anders ist durch diese Erfindung bewerkstelligt
worden, als Zuru¨ckfu¨hrung aller Construction auf Construction durch Zahl—Zuru¨ckfu¨hrung aller a¨ußern
Anschauung auf innre, kurz Verallgemeinerung des Idealismus der Analysis. (Die geometrische Methode
der Alten, und der Neuen, die ihr anhangen, ist in der Mathematik, was der Realismus; die analytische
Methode, was der Idealismus in der Philosophie ist; es ko¨nnte wohl eine Dritte aus beiden geben, die
am Ende die herrschende werden wird). Wenn aber die ganze Mathematik zur Analysis erhoben wird,
so ist evident, daß nichts, was nur Gegenstand des Wissens (im strengsten Sinne) ist, außerhalb ihres
Umkreises fallen kann, denn wenn der Raum nur Form der a¨ußern Anschauung ist, so ist dagegen die
Zeit Form der Anschauung u¨berhaupt, alles was ist, ist eine Funktion der Zeit ... . [38, 180f.]
Thus, for Schelling, time is not simply one of the forms of sensibility, as Kant seems to
have thought, but the form of “Anschauung u¨berhaupt.” Intuition of time is thus the basis
of all construction and, because of this, arithmetic must be taken as the ultimate foundation
of mathematics, a mathematics that no longer needed axioms. Schelling can be seen to be
moving in a direction that calls for the arithmetization of mathematics, a direction reflected
in the arithmetization program and in the ideas of intuitionist mathematics. In conclusion,
Schelling insisted on the opposition between (intellectual) construction and arithmetization,
on the one hand, and the ostensive constructions of geometry and axiomatization, on the
other. This represents a major point of difference between Schelling and Kant, and it had a
great impact on Justus Grassmann. This idea can be found in the first edition of Hermann
Grassmann’s Ausdehnungslehre as well. As we will see, this opposition is taken over by
Justus Grassmann.
CHALLENGING THE FOUNDATIONS OF EUCLIDEAN GEOMETRY
The starting point of Justus Grassmann’s work was the early 18th-century debate over
the place of geometry in primary and secondary school curricula. The question was: Should
“geometry” belong to the core mathematical disciplines that, like elementary arithemtic,
were taught to all students?14 The didactic challenge consisted in understanding the source
of the difficulties raised by geometry teaching and in finding an appropriate solution [16,
vii–viii]. Grassmann noted that as long as geometry is identified with Euclidean geometry,
and geometry teaching is seen as teaching according to the Euclidean method, then the
answer to the previous question has to be negative. Young children do not have the men-
tal sophistication needed to cope with the logical deduction process underlying Euclid’s
Elements. As Grassmann wrote, Euclidean geometry is more suited for men than for chil-
dren [16, xviii]. If this is the case, then clearly the Euclidean approach cannot be used as
a basis for a didactic approach having education to “Selbstta¨tigkeit” as one of its major
commitments.
Given the fact that Kant took Euclidean geometry to be the prototype of mathematical
construction, Grassmann’s views on Euclidean geometry as outlined above are, in a cer-
tain sense, surprising. As is well known, reflections on constructions had a great influence
14 In early 19th-century Prussia, teaching a topic to all students meant teaching it in primary school. The
1817 Raumlehre was written after a draft that had been used both as a textbook for the “Armenschulen” and for
training the sometimes poorly qualified teachers of those schools. Under the conditions of the “Armenschulen,”
mathematics teaching as a whole, and geometry teaching in particular, represented no small challenge. Grassmann
intended the 1817 Raumlehre to be a textbook for teaching geometry to 7- and 8-year-old children [15, iii–iv, xv].
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on Euclid’s work. Indeed, Euclid’s postulates state nothing else than conditions of con-
struction tailored to suit the construction means (ruler and compass) allowed by ancient
Greek geometers. Yet, Grassmann criticized Euclidean geometry because of its excessive
dependence on the “logical moment [logisches Moment]” [16, viii]. What does this mean?
Grassmann’s texts do not provide a conclusive answer. He did not frame his distinction
between the logical and the constructive moments in Euclidean geometry in a clear way.
However, he provided a critique of the Euclidean approach that gives a clue for a better
understanding of his distinction and of his critique of the foundations of Euclidean geometry.
According to Grassmann, geometry is based on two elements: length and direction.
Length represents the properly geometrical object, whereas direction is a combinatorial
element. As he wrote, by disregarding the combinatorial element of geometry (direction),
or, in other words, by taking all lines as equal in respect to direction, we reduce geometry
to the study of one line. Similarly, by taking the objects used in combinatorics as equal, we
reduce combinatorics to arithmetic.15
Grassmann was perfectly correct here. One of the first scientists to have explicitly stated
this idea was Descartes [5, 2]. But whereas Descartes took advantage of this situation for
creating his analytic geometry, Grassmann regarded it as a source of important didactic as
well as scientific difficulties. According to Grassmann, this feature of Euclidean geometry
was most obvious in Euclid’s account of parallelism, which depended on congruence:
Die Theorie der Parallelen, in dem gebra¨uchlichen Sinne genommen, macht sich, meiner Ansicht nach,
eigentlich die Aufgabe, die beiden Elemente der Geometrie, La¨nge und Richtung (Fortschreitung und
Schwenkung) zu verschmelzen, na¨mlich die Richtung durch die La¨nge bestimmen zu wollen.—Nun
la¨ßt sich wohl nicht die Unmo¨glichkeit der Lo¨sung dieser Aufgabe nachweisen, indeß la¨ßt sich so viel
u¨bersehen, daß sie nur auf eine ku¨nstliche, eine systematische Anordnung vielfach durchkreuzende und
dadurch verwirrende Weise wird zu Stande kommen ko¨nnen. ... Es scheint mir daher am besten, diesen
Weg, sofern von einer systematischen Anordnung die Rede ist, ga¨nzlich aufzugeben, und die Lehre von
den Parallelen unmittelbar auf den Begriff der Richtung zu gru¨nden ... . [16, xx–xxi]
By doing away with a geometric account of direction, Euclid simplified some things while
complicating others. In particular, his introduction of a complex, compensatory, conceptual
15 As Grassmann put it, “Es ist nicht hier der Ort, meine Ansicht u¨ber die Mathematik niederzulegen, und muß
mir dieses fu¨r eine andere Zeit vorbehalten, doch kann ich nicht unbemerkt lassen, daß so wie die Synthesis des
Gleichartigen die Gro¨ße, so die Verknu¨pfung des Verschiedenen als eines solchen die Combination giebt, es bestehe
nun diese Verschiedenheit in der vorausgesetzten Ungleichartigkeit der Elemente, oder in ihrer Folge in Zeit und
Raum. Auch die Geometrie hat demnach ihre Combinationslehre ... . Die darin vorausgesetzte Verschiedenheit
ist die Verschiedenheit der Richtung. Was in der allgemeinen Combinationslehre die Ambe (das Gezwei) ist,
erscheint hier theils als Durchschnittspunkt, theils als Winkel, Seite u.s.w., die Terne (das Gedrei) als Dreieck.
Was in der allgemeinen Combinationslehre gleichartige Elemente sind, zwischen denen sich also nicht weiter,
als in Beziehung auf ihre Zahl combiniren la¨ßt, sind hier gleichlaufende Linien. Was dort die Darstellung der
Combinationen ist, die man ja auch ihre Figur nennt, ist hier die Zeichnung; die Berechnung ist in beiden vo¨llig
a¨hnlich” [15, x–xi]. Here we find in a concise form a definition of the individual mathematical disciplines (geometry,
arithmetic, and combinatorics), which is discussed in greater detail in the 1827 Zahlenlehre (see below). According
to this approach, Euclidean geometry is reduced to the study of those results that can be expressed as relations
between segments belonging to the same line; the concept of dimension is thus foreign to this type of geometry.
Grassmann identified Euclidean geometry with this type of geometry. The fact that space is three dimensional is
irrelevant to such a theory. Dimension is taken into account only if that which Grassmann saw as the properly
geometric is united to the combinatorial elements. The geometry studied by Grassmann is combinatorial geometry
in the sense described here.
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framework introduced an artificial distance between the diagrams studied in geometry and
their theoretical reflection, and a confusing order of the theorems. In this way, Euclidean
geometry was marred by a discrepancy between the order of the theorems as required by
the geometric objects, on the one hand, and by the conceptual framework imposed on it, on
the other. This forced Euclid to use (syllogistic) logic rather than geometric evidence as a
guide for his inferences. Grassmann demanded an account of geometry in which direction
is given priority over length.16
In this light, Grassmann’s distinction between the logical and the constructive moments
in geometry can be seen as follows. In Euclidean geometry, construction is framed so
as to reduce geometric complexity. This reduction is achieved by ultimately expressing
everything in terms of lengths and relations between lengths. For Grassmann, Euclidean
geometry was basically an arithmetized geometry, and the construction devices as well as the
postulates were tailored accordingly. This approach, however, created a rupture between the
geometric object and its conceptual description, between synthesis and analysis. To avoid
this situation, which Grassmann regarded as unsatisfactory, the account of construction on
which Euclid relied had to be changed.
If the previous interpretation is correct, then one would expect Grassmann (i) to consider
the introduction of a different set of construction means, and possibly of new postulates
capable of revealing a new harmony between object and concept, between construction and
conceptual reflection and (ii) to relate this to the requirements of teaching. And, indeed, in
his foreword to the 1824 Raumlehre, he did precisely this, writing
ich [habe] mich bemu¨ht, die Construktion u¨berall so anzuwenden und zu leiten, daß sich der Lehrsatz
daraus unmittelbar ergiebt, d.h. daß er nur als eine Aussage u¨ber die angestellte Construktion, als ein
Ausdruck dessen erscheint, was sich bei der Construktion unmittelbar vorgefunden hat, und ich mo¨chte
diese Methode, freilich in einem andern Sinne, als dieses sonst in der Mathematik u¨blich ist, die eigentlich
synthetische Methode nennen, insbesondere dann, wenn sie es sich zum Gesetze macht, combinatorisch
vom Einfachern zum Zusammengesetzten fortzuschreiten.
Da hiernach die einzelnen Sa¨tze nicht sowohl auf Vordersa¨tze gegru¨ndet, als vielmehr unmittelbar aus
der Construktion hergeleitet, und durch jene unvermittelt in ihrer Wahrheit erkannt werden, so gewa¨hrte
mir das den Vortheil einer anderen Anordnung, welche ich aber doch nicht eine willku¨rliche genannt
wissen mo¨chte. Im Sinne der Euklidischen Geometrie hat man bei der systematischen Anordnung
hauptsa¨chlich nur darauf zu sehen, daß jeder Satz auf eine Stelle zu stehen kommt, wo er aus vorherge-
henden Sa¨tzen in seiner Wahrheit vollsta¨ndig erkannt werden ko¨nne. Die anderweitige Verwandtschaft
der Sa¨tze wird dabei nur auf eine untergeordnete Weise beru¨cksichtigt. Diese Anordnung habe ich nun
ga¨nzlich verlassen, und dafu¨r die combinatorische gewa¨hlt, weil dabei die Uebersicht außerordentlich
erleichtert wird; und die verwandten Sa¨tze na¨her zusammengebracht werden. Um diesen Zweck ohne
Aufopferung der Evidenz zu erreichen, mußte ich die Construktion zu erweitern suchen, und mich von
der Verschra¨nkung durch die Euklidischen Postulate dispensiren. Ich fordere demnach ohne weiteres die
Halbirung oder jede andere Gleichteilung irgend einer ra¨umlichen Gro¨ße, da es fu¨r die Einsicht in die
theoretischen Sa¨tze gar nicht auf die wirkliche Ausfu¨hrung, sondern nur auf die denkbare Mo¨glichkeit,
daß eine solche Theilung statt finden ko¨nne, aufkommt ... . Eben so fordere ich eine Linie um einen
Punkte in einer Ebene sich schwenken zu lassen, eine Linie, Seite, Ebene Figur stets gleichlaufend mit
sich selbst nach irgend einer Richtung fortzubewegen u.s.w. ... . [16, xi–xii]
16 A similar position can be found in Hermann Grassmann’s 1844 edition of the Ausdehnungslehre. He criticized
the separation of synthesis and analysis, characterizing analytic geometry [13, 1.1:8–9] as well as Euclid’s approach
to similarity, which relies on the Eudoxian theory of proportions as a prerequisite. He described his calculus of
extension as an approach that avoids dualism and allows a treatment of similarity that does not require the theory
of proportions [13, 1.1:137 ff.]. It is significant that his approach to geometry is based on the vector concept, that
is, on a concept in which length and direction are united.
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Here, Grassmann not only rejected Euclid’s postulates but also suggested the adoption
of a new foundation for geometry based on geometric transformations such as symmetry
and translation. He argued as well for an account of geometry free from the restrictions
imposed by understanding construction as actual ruler and compass constructibility. He
pled for a separation of pure theory described as dealing only with possible constructions
from its actual applications and contended that his approach was truly synthetic, that is,
relied on an iconic representation by means of geometric diagrams of an abstractly imag-
ined construction procedure rather than on an actual construction in Euclid’s sense. The
proofs of the theorems were no longer derived from Euclid’s or from some alternative
set of postulates, but from the construction procedures. In accordance with his terminol-
ogy, one might call the conditions of construction as outlined in the previous quotation
as “Forderungen” rather than as “Grundsa¨tze”, the standard German term used at the
time to refer to postulates in Euclid’s sense. Grassmann was not very clear on the sta-
tus of his “Forderungen”. They could be regarded as formal axioms as opposed to intu-
itional axioms (a term introduced by Albert Lewis [26, 138–139]) of Euclidean geome-
try. Yet, we must keep in mind that in the mathematical part of his writings Grassmann
never mentioned axioms and postulates. On the contrary, he argued that all the notions and
results could be generated by means of discrete and of continuous synthesis, that is, by
positing and connecting and by moving a point (see below). Moreover, in combinatorial
geometry, deductive proof was considered useless and was replaced by construction: “die
einzelnen Sa¨tze nicht sowohl auf Vordersa¨tze gegru¨ndet, als vielmehr unmittelbar aus der
Construktion hergeleitet, und durch jene unvermittelt in ihrer Wahrheit erkannt werden” [16,
xi].17 Grassmann’s insistence on the constructive moment in mathematics, as well as his re-
jection of deductive proof and of the axiomatic method, can be linked to Schelling’s position.
Briefly, the major commitments of Grassmann’s program as outlined above are: (i) the
rejection of the arithmetization of geometry, (ii) the rejection of reducing geometric infer-
ence to syllogistic inference, (iii) the opposition between an axiomatic (real) approach and
a constructive (formal) approach (which suggests an emphasis on the deontologization of
geometry), and (iv) the adoption of a constructive (basically transformational) approach to
geometry. Grassmann’s account of geometry and its teaching appears to be guided by a set
of strong methodological commitments that can be expressed by means of the following key
words and phrases: deontologization; de-arithmetization, anti-axiomatic; anti-syllogistic;
formal, combinatorial (in contrast to actual, Euclidean) synthesis; direct diagrammatic ev-
idence (pictorially displaying the unifying idea behind the proof, that is, behind the con-
struction steps); and harmony between synthesis and analysis.18
17 Grassmann did not provide a systematic discussion of these foundational issues that went any further than what
is stated in the given quotation. It is important to note that his distinction between actual and possible constructions
in geometry anticipated the distinction between real and formal mathematics formulated by Hermann Grassmann
in the 1844 edition of the Ausdehnungslehre. Similarly, Justus Grassmann’s opposition of the dualist, deductive,
axiomatic approach to mathematics and the abstract, genetic approach to mathematics, and his preference for the
genetic approach were also taken over by Hermann Grassmann, and, among other things, they were reflected in
the latter’s explicit rejection of using Grundsa¨tze in pure mathematics and logic formulated in the first edition of
the Ausdehnungslehre.
18 All this is described by Grassmann not directly as a program for a new foundation of mathematics as a
whole, and not even for a new foundation of geometry, but rather as the basis for a new geometry, which he
called combinatorial geometry. The latter would be truly constructive and would allow the mathematician and the
learner to meet and communicate. Combinatorial geometry appeared as a mathematical discipline where, due to
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To conclude this section, it can be said that in the two volumes of the Raumlehre, in accor-
dance with the spirit of his time, Grassmann took a didactic difficulty as an indication of an
epistemological problem. The core of the epistemological problem was the relation between
object (diagram) and concept or, in other words, between the particular and the general in
geometry. Basically, Grassmann distinguished between two ways of relating to a diagram.
The first consisted in regarding the diagram merely as a concrete object, as given in sense
experience. Initially, children may tend to look upon the geometric diagrams in this way,
and one of the tasks of the teacher is to help them overcome this position, which is of no use
in mathematics. The second consisted in looking at the diagram from the perspective of the
construction procedure that generates it. In this case, the diagram ceases to be simply a con-
crete object of sense experience. It becomes a concrete embodiment of the general procedure
or, in other words, a product of the constructive activity of the mind [16, ix]. The mind has
the capacity to grasp the constructive procedure as materialized in a geometric diagram.19
CONSTRUCTION AND INTUITION IN GRASSMANN’S
ACCOUNT OF GEOMETRY
Grassmann linked his critique of the Euclidean method (his Schelling-like thesis concern-
ing the separation between the logical and the constructive moments in Euclidean geometry,
in particular) with a discussion of the role of intuition in mathematics. Unfortunately, he did
not insist on the subject, nor did he attempt to compare his position with other “standard”
accounts such as those of Kant or Schelling. What he did say suggests, however, that he
moved in Schelling’s direction.
According to Grassmann, construction is an intellectual activity based on a combination
of what he called external or sensible intuition and internal or intellectual intuition. The
only passage where Grassmann explicitly mentioned this follows:
Es ist aber, meiner Ueberzeugung nach, keineswegs das logische Moment, was den Mathematiker
macht, sondern die Kraft der Construktion, und diese Kraft la¨ßt sich schon im zartesten Alter u¨ben
und entwickeln; ... . Die Kinder mu¨ssen alles durch Anschauung, und nicht durch den Begriff haben,
ja ich mo¨chte behaupten, daß diese bei jedem Mathematiker, sofern er ein solcher ist, der Fall sein
muß. Es bedarf wohl kaum des Zusatzes, daß hier unter Anschauung nicht die a¨ußere sinnliche, sondern
die innere, die Anschauung der Ta¨tigkeit des construirenden Geistes oder die Anschauung der innern
Construktion gemeint sei. Jene geho¨rt gar nicht fu¨r die Mathematik, als sofern sie etwa gebraucht
werden kann, die innere Anschauung zu wecken und festzuhalten; sie ist ein unwesentliches, aber
oft unentbehrliches methodisches Hu¨lfsmittel, um die innere Anschauung versta¨ndlich mitzuteilen, oft
auch um die gewonnenen Resultate fu¨r sich zu fixiren, und dem Geiste dadurch, daß er die innerliche
Construktion sich a¨ußerlich gegenu¨berstellt, einen Ruhepunkt zu gewa¨hren und zu sichern, von welchem
aus er von Neuem weiter fortschreiten kann. [16, viii–ix]
In this short paragraph, Grassmann revealed his belief that construction is important for
mathematics education because it is important to the mathematician. The separation between
external and internal intuition and the independence of the latter and the former (in the sense
that, as far as mathematics is concerned, external intuition cannot either impose restrictions
the transparency of the diagrammatic evidence, the “Einheit der Wissenschaft” (i.e., its systematic character) and
the “Selbstta¨tigkeit” principle could be best harmonized.
19 Footnote deleted in proof.
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on intellectual intuition or act as a guide to it) suggest a shift from Kant’s rejection of intel-
lectual intuition to Schelling’s position in which intellectual intuition plays an essential role.
THE 1827 FOUNDATIONAL PROGRAM: THE DEFINITION OF MATHEMATICS
According to Grassmann, a definition of mathematics has to meet several requirements. It
must (a) express the unity of mathematics; (b) reflect the specific character of mathematical
thinking (as opposed to logical thinking, for instance); (c) allow a natural classification
of the mathematical disciplines; (d) allow a natural organization of the propositions of
each mathematical discipline into a sequence that is not simply determined by the formal
constraints of (syllogistic) logic, but by the specific way in which each of the individual
disciplines constructs its concrete sign aggregates; and (e) explain the possibility of applying
the results of one purely mathematical discipline to another. Grassmann developed his
definition of mathematics in two steps. In the first, he introduced a distinction between
mathematical and logical synthesis. In the second, he developed his concept of mathematical
construction by introducing the distinctions discrete–continuous and equal–unequal.
Step 1
The basis of Grassmann’s approach is the idea that goals (a)–(e) cannot be attained
without moving away from ontological definitions of mathematics and turning toward a
methodological definition. Grassmann defined mathematics in the following way:
Die Mathematik erzeugt ihre Begriffe durch eine ihr eigentu¨mliche Synthesis ... in dem sie von dem
Inhalte des zu verknu¨pfenden ga¨nzlich absieht. Es ist aber nicht die Form dieser Synthesis, sondern das
Produkt derselben ihr Gegenstand, und dadurch unterscheidet sie sich von der Logik, welche einen Inhalt
zwar im Allgemeinen voraussetzt, aber von demselben abstrahirt, wohingegen in der mathematischen
Construktion dadurch ein Inhalt hervorgebracht wird, daß man das zu verknu¨pfende als inhaltlos setzt.
[17, 3]
He went on to say that
Wir haben nun diejenige Beziehung, vermo¨ge deren das zu verknu¨pfende als einander zukommend
betrachtet wird, weil man dabei einen Inhalt voraussetzt, eine Synthesis nach innern Beziehungen
genannt, und werden daher diejenige, bei welcher es als schlechthin gleich oder als schlechthin ungleich
gesetzt wird, eine Synthesis nach a¨ußern Beziehungen nennen mu¨ssen, woraus sich ergiebt, daß:
die Mathematik die Wissenschaft ist von der Synthesis
nach a¨ußern Beziehungen, d.h. als gleich oder als ungleich. [17, 4; his emphasis]
The main elements of this definition are the distinction between mathematical (external)
and logical (internal) synthesis and between content and form. His definition raises several
questions, however. How does mathematical synthesis work? How does logical synthesis
work? Does mathematical synthesis play a part in logic? Conversely, does logical synthesis
play any part in mathematics?20
20 Grassmann’s paper does not give a theoretical discussion rich enough to provide a clear answer to any of
these questions. To reach a more accurate understanding of the way in which he understood these distinctions, one
must turn to his examples.
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FIG. 1.
Step 2
Grassmann proceeded by elaborating on his concept of mathematical (external) synthesis.
He postulated that, in principle, there can be no more than four fundamental types of
mathematical synthesis obtained by combining the elements of the distinctions equal–
unequal and discrete-continuous as in Fig. 1.21
“Synthesis as equal” produces “magnitude [Gro¨ße],” whereas “synthesis as unequal”
produces “combination [Combination].” The outcome of the first type of synthesis is the
“science of magnitudes [Gro¨ßenlehre],” whereas the outcome of the second is “combina-
torics [Combinationslehre].” On the other hand, “synthesis as discrete” produces extensive
sign aggregates (i.e., sign aggregates for which the parts—the individual tokens—precede
the whole), whereas “synthesis as continuous” produces intensive sign aggregates (i.e., sign
aggregates in which the parts are generated at the same time as the whole).
This frame suggests the definitions and classification of the individual mathematical
disciplines according to the basic type of construction that generates the sign aggregates of
each of them (Fig. 2) [17, 6]. These definitions of the individual mathematical disciplines
illustrate Grassmann’s methodological approach: each discipline is defined not by means of
its object but by means of the specific method used in the construction of the corresponding
type of concrete object. In the case of the equal–unequal distinction, this methodological
turn in the definition of mathematics is made obvious by the following remark:
Daß wir, nachdem wir den Inhalt des zu verknu¨pfenden aufgehoben haben, dasselbe nicht bloß als
gleich, sondern auch als ungleich ansehen und so verknu¨pfen ko¨nnen, scheint unmittelbar klar zu sein,
da mit der Gleichheit die Ungleichheit zugleich gegeben ist. Nur ist hier nicht an irgend eine bestimmte
qualitative Ungleichheit, sondern nur an Verschiedenheit im Allgemeinen, als eines Inhaltlosen, zu
denken. ... Gleichheit und Ungleichheit sind nur Momente an dem zu verknu¨pfenden, und es kommt
nur darauf an, welches von beiden Momenten als die der Synthesis zum Grunde liegenden Bestimmung
gilt, wa¨hrend stets beide vorhanden sind. [17, 4–5]22
Thus, in themselves, the signs involved in some mathematical syntheses are neither equal
nor unequal. It is the way in which we conceive the synthesis, the construction method,
that determines one option or the other. The equal–unequal distinction is only a relative
one.
21 The diagram presented in Fig. 1 is a slightly modified version of a diagram used by Grassmann himself
[17, 7].
22 One of the important changes undertaken by Hermann Grassmann consisted precisely in abandoning this
dualism between the distinctions equal–unequal and discrete–continuous.
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FIG. 2.
One might then expect Grassmann to adopt a similar position in the case of the discrete–
continuous distinction. Yet, this is not the case. His explicit rejection of such a position can
be seen from his discussion of the possibility of identifying a fundamental mathematical dis-
cipline that would correspond to a continuous synthesis of the unequal. Grassmann wrote:
“Nur das eine muß ich hier noch bemerken, daß die Combinationen nicht auf gleiche Weise
wie die Gro¨ßen in discrete und stetige zerfallen, indem es keine Synthesis des Ungleichar-
tigen gibt und geben kann, durch welche die Elemente der Combinationen in der Synthesis
selbst und durch sie erzeugt wu¨rden. Die Combinationen sind daher wesentlich diskret ...”
[17, 6–7]. This represents an explicit rejection of the fourth mathematical discipline, and at
the same time, it clearly states the radical separation of discrete and continuous syntheses.23
In the end, Grassmann arrived at a classification of the individual mathematical disciplines
as in Fig. 3.
This almost completes Grassmann’s second step, yet two more related aspects need to
be emphasized. They concern Grassmann’s account of mathematical synthesis, magnitude,
and combination.
In his definition of mathematics above, Grassmann referred to mathematical synthesis
in general and thus gave the impression of allowing a unique, general mathematical syn-
thesis, the outcome of which would be an equally general product of synthesis. He did not
admit, however, such a general mathematical synthesis. In the Zahlenlehre, the expression
“mathematical synthesis” represents a simple name referring to the three distinct kinds
of synthesis corresponding to the couples continuous–equal, discrete–equal, and, finally,
discrete–unequal. As a result, Grassmann could not allow a unique general type of product
of mathematical synthesis. His terminology pointed this out quite clearly: he recognized
only continuous or intensive magnitude, discrete or arithmetical (extensive) magnitude, and
discrete (extensive) combination.24 The absence of a general concept of mathematical syn-
thesis and of a general concept of product of mathematical synthesis created difficulties that
23 Basically, the most plausible candidate for the fourth mathematical discipline would be combinatorial ge-
ometry. Despite the fact that his combinatorial geometry represents Grassmann’s most significant mathematical
contribution, this discipline was denied a place among the basic mathematical disciplines. The reason for this is
that, according to Grassmann, combinatorial geometry did not have a specific type of mathematical construction
as its foundation.
24 Note that Grassmann used expressions such as “magnitude” and “combination” only relative to the outcome
of mathematical synthesis. The initial entities that are connected in order to generate magnitude and combination
were called simply “that to be connected.”
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FIG. 3. Justus Grassmann’s generation matrix.
became apparent when Grassmann tried to explain the relation between algebra,25 logic,
and the three fundamental mathematical disciplines.
THE FOUNDATIONS OF ARITHMETIC: NATURAL NUMBERS
The way in which f2; 3; 4; : : :g is extended to include zero and one is extremely rele-
vant for Grassmann’s position. Grassmann argued that his approach did not extend the set
f2; 3; 4; : : :g, but replaced an unsatisfactory account of natural numbers with a suitable one.
What at a first glance may look like an extension step was described as a mere correction of a
mistake. In this way, he maintained that zero and one rightfully belong to the reine Zahlen-
lehre, that is, one and zero are seen as products of genuine arithmetical synthesis. This
position is especially puzzling in the case of zero. Indeed, how can zero be an outcome of
arithmetical synthesis? To accommodate zero and one in the reine Zahlenlehre, Grassmann
introduced a second definition of number construction that differed slightly from his initial
definition of synthesis in arithmetic. Judging by the way in which he presented his new
definition, however, he seemed unaware that his second definition of natural number was
indeed different from the first.26
Grassmann maintained that both zero and one are essential for a good development of
mathematical computations. Therefore these numbers cannot be banned from mathematics,
and clarifying their nature becomes a fundamental task [17, 9].27 What is the nature of
the difficulty raised by these particular numbers? Grassmann considered that under the
25 Algebra was not included among the fundamental mathematical disciplines. Neither was it included among
those disciplines that could be obtained by combining the three fundamental mathematical disciplines. Grassmann’s
reason for this was his conviction that algebra was not constructive in the sense in which the other three disciplines
were. The symbolic constructions of algebra were understood not as genuine products of mathematical construction
but as mere linguistic devices that could be used only in conjunction with the true mathematical ontology produced
by the three individual, mathematical construction types listed above.
26 As we shall see, Grassmann considered three definitions of natural number.
27 It is perhaps interesting to compare the ideas of Grassmann with those of Bolzano, which were developed
independently and almost simultaneously. Bolzano also took note of the unsatisfactory status of zero and one,
but unlike Grassmann, he excluded zero from the realm of natural number and assigned it the same status as the
negative and the irrational numbers, that is, as “improper [uneigentlich]” extensions of the natural number concept
[2, 15 ff.].
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standard account, the concept of number is derived from multitude. But neither zero nor
one represents multitudes, so they cannot be numbers [17, 9–10]. Grassmann claimed that
the difficulties linked to the status of one and zero lay in the received view of number, which
conflated two independent aspects: the concept of number per se and the genetic point of
view, reflecting the way in which numbers emerge in human culture and cognition. The latter
is based on our subjective “representation [Vorstellung]” of multitude. Due to this conflation,
multitude was erroneously taken to be the basis of the number concept.28 Grassmann took
the unsatisfactory explanation of zero and one as an indication of the inappropriateness of
what he called the genetic foundation of arithmetic as a whole. How can we eliminate the
difficulties raised by zero and one? Grassmann’s answer was anchored in his definition of
arithmetic and of number. However, the issue is not simple since Grassmann used no less
than three such definitions.
In his first definition, Grassmann described arithmetical synthesis as external synthesis of
the discrete taken as equal. The outcome of this synthesis is discrete arithmetical magnitude.
Grassmann repeated this definition several times. Here is one formulation that preceded
Grassmann’s critical discussion of the unsatisfactory status of zero and of one: “Eine discrete
Gro¨ße war, ... eine solche, bei welcher das als gleichartig zu verknu¨pfende als schlechthin
gegeben betrachtet wurde, ohne daß es in der Construktion der Gro¨ße erst entstehen durfte,
oder von bestimmter Beschaffenheit vorausgesetzt werden mußte” [17, 9]. What does this
mean? How can something be an “object [Gro¨ße]” and a concept at the same time? I have
illustrated Grassmann’s position on the relationship between concept and object relative to
geometry above. Now it is important to have a closer look at the way in which he construed
this relation in arithmetic. I will consider Grassmann’s treatment of the following examples:
(i) 1C 1, (ii) 1C 1D 2, and (iii) 2C 3D 5.
Grassmann presented 1C 1 as a product of genuine, mathematical (in fact, arithmetical)
external synthesis. He noted that one might be tempted to consider 1C 1 as having the
form subject–copula–predicate; i.e., one may consider 1C 1 to be a judgment. However, he
considered this interpretation only to provide two arguments against it. First, in 1C 1 there
is no distinction between subject and predicate. Second, and this was the main argument,
it does not make any sense to ask whether 1C 1 is true or possible. It is always possible
as a mathematical synthesis, and its outcome is the complete concept named two. Thus,
1C 1 is described as the product of external arithmetical synthesis and, at the same time,
as the complete concept named two [17, 3]. As far as pure arithmetic is concerned, the
significance of 1C 1 does not depend on the content of the individual tokens 1 andC, but
on the way in which they are externally connected to each other. We do not have a concept
of two that goes before or that can be used independently of signs like 1C 1.
28
“Wenn wir daher auf die Entstehung des Zahlbegriffs in uns zuru¨ckgehen, so ist klar, daß wir nur durch die
Betrachtung eines Mannigfaltigen, einer Vielheit in unsern Vorstellungen, d.h. hier sofern sie Eins u¨berschreiten,
zu der Vorstellung der Zahl werden gelangen ko¨nnen. Die genetische Erkla¨rung der Zahl wird daher notwendig
so ausfallen mu¨ssen, so daß sie auf Eins und Null nicht mehr paßt. Dieses ist aber keineswegs hinreichend, um
diese aus der Zahlenlehre herauszuwerfen, da die Art, wie ein Begriff in uns entsteht, keineswegs den Begriff an
sich bestimmt.
Der Begriff der Zahl wurde also in uns geweckt durch die Anschauung eines Mannigfaltigen in unseren Vorstel-
lungen, wenn man von ihrem verschiedenen Inhalte abstrahirt, und sie alle als gleich setzt.-Der Begriff einer
Zahl kommt dadurch zu Stande, daß dieses bestimmte Mannigfaltige in eine Einheit des Bewußtseins verknu¨pft
wird.-Jede der als gleichartig gedachten Vorstellungen nennt man in Beziehung auf die Zahl die Einheit” [17, 10].
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The expression 1C 1D 2 does not represent a judgment either, since the act of attach-
ing the sign 2 to 1C 1 adds nothing to the complete concept 1C 1. This act is basically
superfluous [16, 3]. It is important to stress that Grassmann did not accept 2 as a genuine
outcome of mathematical synthesis. According to this view, 2D 1C 1 is merely a nominal
definition.
The situation is different in the case of 2C 3D 5:29 Unlike 1C 1 and 1C 1D 2; 2C 3D 5
is described as a judgment. By themselves, 2C 3 and 5 are not genuine products of math-
ematical synthesis. Grassmann called 2C 3 a “colligation [Zusammenstellung]” and 5 a
“union [Vereinigung]” and sometimes a “sum.” According to this terminology, 1C 1 is a
magnitude, a colligation, but not a union; 2C 3 is a colligation, which is neither a union
nor a magnitude; and finally, 2 is a union, which is neither a magnitude nor a colligation.
In contrast to 1C 1 and 1C 1D 2; 2C 3D 5 cannot be obtained unconditionally. The latter
identity is qualified as a judgment rather than as an outcome of construction because its
acceptance depends on the verification of its truth. This involves replacing the signs used in
the identity with their arithmetical content. Thus, 2 must be replaced with 1C 1, etc. Then
2C 3 becomes (1C 1)C (1C 1C 1) and by means of mathematical synthesis, all these to-
kens can be united into a unique whole 1C 1C 1C 1C 1, which, by convention, is the
arithmetical content of 5. The expression 2C 3D 5 is the form to which the following con-
tent corresponds: (1C 1)C (1C 1C 1)D (1C 1C 1C 1C 1). This involves a content–form
rupture, and therefore it has to be seen as involving logical synthesis, which is based on
arithmetical synthesis. The content is determined by the mathematical synthesis, whereas
the form is determined by the introduction of conventional definitions such as 1C 1D 2. As
far as arithmetic is concerned, logical synthesis is made possible by mathematical synthesis.
On the other hand, there is a sense in which logical synthesis (and therefore the symbolic
form as well) has relative freedom from the mathematical content. The previous examples
do not really illustrate this. Such an illustration will be given in the next section.
Grassmann stated his second definition of a natural number in these terms: “Die Zahl
an sich ... muß als die bestimmte Quantita¨t des Setzens der Einheit angesehen werden,
und da man die Einheit auch einmal oder gar nicht setzen kann, so mu¨ssen auch Eins
und Null zu den Zahlen gerechnet werden, wenngleich sie durch keine Verknu¨pfung eines
Mannigfaltigen entstanden sind” [17, 10]. Here, there is a significant distinction between,
say, the concrete object jjj and its quantity, which is a general entity. It may be denoted, of
course, by 3 or three, or even by jjj, but this does not change the situation. The distinction
is one between a concrete representative of a class and the class itself or, in more general
terms, between object and concept. According to Grassmann’s first definition, number
appeared as an outcome of arithmetical synthesis, and this left no room for a concept–
object or class-representative distinction. The fact that he felt compelled to replace his first
definition (or, as it were, to rephrase it) represented an implicit recognition of two facts:
(i) that definition 1 (with its object–concept identification) did not provide an adequate
basis for the introduction of zero as a natural number, and (ii) that the introduction of zero
(as a genuine natural number and not as a mere syntactic fiction) depended on admitting
that logical synthesis is sometimes needed in constructing the products of mathematics.
It goes without saying that Grassmann would not subscribe to any of these statements.
29 Grassmann actually presented the example of 7C 8D 15, but I shall replace it with 2C 3D 5, which is easier
to handle.
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From what has been said, Grassmann’s position according to which zero (as obtained by
means of definition 2) is a natural number amounted to an implicit recognition that, inside
mathematics, there is a relative independence of the conceptual level and thus of logical
synthesis from mathematical synthesis and that logical construction has to be assigned a
constructive role inside mathematics.
Relative to this second definition of a natural number, Grassmann’s discussion of the
introduction of zero as a natural number is important because it reflects the tension between
two conflicting positions: a reductionist one based on a strict dualism between mathematical
and logical construction (and on the corresponding distinction between the object–concept
relation—from a mathematical and from a logical perspective), and a realist position based
on the complementarity between mathematical and logical synthesis and on hypostatic
abstraction.30 As far as zero is concerned, Grassmann wrote as a realist. At the same time,
in his general definition of mathematics as well as in his account of the other number realms
(the negatives in particular; see below), he wrote as a nominalist.
The basis of the third definition of a natural number was the concept of constructive
activity of the mind. In relation to the construction of a natural number, Grassmann consid-
ered a pair of opposite constructive operations: “counting [Za¨hlen]” or “first level counting
[erste Stufe des Za¨hlens]” and “decomposing [Auflo¨sen].” He regarded these operations
as intellectual construction processes. He defined a number as the product of the counting
activity and counting as the processes of positing the unit and then grasping the discrete re-
sulting aggregate as a whole: “Die Tha¨tigkeit des Geistes zur Hervorbringung einer Zahl aus
der Einheit nennt man das Za¨hlen, und diese besteht in dem Zusammenfassen gegebener
Einheiten in eine Einheit des Bewußtseyns. Das Gegentheil des Za¨hlens nennt man das
Auflo¨sen, wodurch also das im Bewußtsein Vereinigte wieder getrennt, das Zusammenge-
faßte wieder in seine Bestandtheile zerstreut wird” [17, 12].
In conclusion, Grassmann’s natural number concept was construed as involving three
components: a product or a concept–object obtained by means of a constructive, real defini-
tion, like 1C 1; a symbolic representation of the number concept introduced by means of a
nominal definition like 2 as a name for 1C 1; and number as quantity, that is, as a logically
determined hypostatic abstraction. This latter definition was only used to legitimate the
introduction of zero as a genuine natural number and did not play any part in the rest of
Grassmann’s treatment of natural numbers.
THE FOUNDATIONS OF ARITHMETIC: THE NEGATIVE INTEGERS31
Grassmann briefly mentioned two ways of introducing the negative integers: a strictly
ordinal one based on an implicit use of the so-called principle of permanence and one based
on hypostatic abstraction. I shall discuss the latter only. In a key passage, Grassmann wrote:
30 Here, I use this term in the sense given to if by Charles S. Peirce. Basically, Peirce understood hypostatic
abstraction to be an operation by means of which the predicate of a subject could be converted into a genuine
subject, or, as Peirce put it, hypostatic abstraction “furnishes us the means of turning predicates from being signs
that we think or think through, into being subjects thought of” [33, 2.227].
31 I now move on to Grassmann’s treatment of the extensions of the natural number system. In his Zahlenlehre,
Grassmann discussed several extensions ranging from the negative integers to the irrational numbers. His treatment
of these topics was, however, rather brief. Some interesting details were provided for the negative integers. Thus,
I will use only his introduction of the negative integers as an illustration of his understanding of the extension
process in arithmetic.
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Zuna¨chst muß bemerkt werden, daß wir, wenn wir die Verknu¨pfung zur Addition mit der Verknu¨pfung
von Subject und Pra¨dicat in einem logischen Urteil zusammenstellen, hierunter allemal ein solches ver-
stehen, welches die Philosophen ein synthetisches nennen. Es muß das mit dem Subjecte zu verknu¨pfende
Pra¨dicat nicht im Begriffe desselben liegen, sondern zu demselben hinzukommen, und die Erkenntnis
des Subjects erweitern, nicht bloß verdeutlichen. Ebenso muß der negative Satz als ein solcher gedacht
werden, der aus dem Subjecte ein darin bisher als vorhanden betrachtetes Pra¨dicat hinwegnimmt. Wie
nun bei dem logischen Satze die Verneinung, welche zur Form des Urtheils geho¨rt, in das Pra¨dicat gelegt
werden kann, so daß das Urtheil, welches die Form eines bejahten hat, doch seiner Bedeutung nach ein
verneinendes ist, und umgekehrt, so kann man auch bei der allgemeinen arithmetischen Verknu¨pfung
die Negation in die zu verknu¨pfende Zahl selbst hineinlegen, so daß die Verknu¨pfung die Form einer
Addition beibeha¨lt, wa¨hrend sie doch ihrer Bedeutung nach eine Subtraction ist, und umgekehrt, die
Form einer Subtraction haben kann, wa¨hrend sie doch ihrer Bedeutung nach eine Addition ist. Die Sache
ist an sich dieselbe, nur in dem einen Falle auf Begriffe, in dem anderen auf Zahlen angewandt, wie man
leicht u¨bersieht, wenn man einen logischen und arithmetischen Satz zusammenstellt; z.B.
Cajus-ist- Cajus-ist nicht- Cajus-ist- Cajus-ist nicht-
gelehrt gelehrt ungelehrt ungelehrt
aC b a¡ b aC (¡b) a¡ (¡b)
Hiernach ist eine negative Zahl eine solche, bei welcher das, was urspru¨nglich zur Form der Verknu¨pfung
geho¨rt, in die Zahl selbst hineingelegt ist. [17, 31–32]
Here, 5-2 is interpreted as a logical statement in which the subject 5 is denied the predicate 2.
Therefore 5-2 appears as a logical synthesis between the subject 5 and a negative predicate
(¡2), that is, as 5C (¡2). Basically, ¡2 appears as a hypostatic abstraction made possible
due to the relative independence of thinking, of the logical form of its mathematical content.
The object–content rupture characterizes logic and is responsible for its capacity to gener-
ate new concepts by self-reflection combined with hypostatic abstraction. One might feel
tempted to go one step further and say that -2 is not just a form but also a new mathematical
product. This could be done only if one enlarged the toolbox of mathematical synthesis to
include logical or symbolic construction means as well. I have suggested that Grassmann’s
acceptance of zero as a natural number amounted to precisely this. However, in the case of
the negative integers, he rejected this possibility:
In der reinen Zahlenlehre (i.e. the arithmetic of natural number) ist freilich die Grenze des Vorhan-
denen die Grenze der Auflo¨sung; es ist aber das Wesen der negativen Zahl, daß bei ihrer Bildung
diese Grenze u¨berschritten werden muß; eben darum geho¨rt sie nicht mehr in die reine Zahlenlehre,
da ihr kein selbsta¨ndiger Werth beigelegt werden kann. Diesen kann sie nur erhalten, wenn der Einheit
Verha¨ltnisse der Richtung ... untergelegt werden, und dieser Umstand ist entscheidend, um sie aus der
reinen Zahlenlehre zu verweisen. [17, 33–34]
Thus, according to Grassmann, the reine Zahlenlehre could not be extended to include
negative numbers. But he went even further: he called the negative numbers analytic numbers
and described them as relational entities.32 They were merely linguistic representations to
which no specific mathematical synthesis and therefore no specific mathematical product
corresponds [17, 30]. Logical synthesis could be used to introduce new concepts (such
as ¡2), but as far as mathematics is concerned, these new concepts could not stand for
themselves, and they certainly could not be used independently or be placed ahead of those
concepts given by genuine mathematical synthsis.
Let me now return to Grassmann’s definition of mathematics and see what this all means.
Grassmann seemed to say that in (pure) mathematics there is no distinction between content
32 The same label was used with respect to all the rational and the irrational numbers.
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and form, between object and concept. In other words, truly mathematical definitions were
real definitions. The definition of 2 as 1C 1 was not a real mathematical definition but a
superfluous convention. In contrast to mathematics, logic always involved a content–form
rupture. Grassmann’s account allowed the interpretation of 2D 1C 1 as a logical definition.
However, logical statements could still be synthetic and at the same time mathematical,
provided that their ultimate ground was a mathematical synthesis. The situation was some-
what different in the case of ¡2. Such entities were not direct products of mathematical
synthesis. Basically, this amounted to a postulational strategy backed by the introduction of
new symbolic means. In this way, 5¡ 2 could be interpreted as 5C (¡2), and, in this way,
a logical operation would be turned into a new object. To accept the negative numbers as
elements of the reine Zahlenlehre, or at least of an extended reine Zahlenlehre, would mean
to accept the adoption of such construction means inside mathematics. But Grassmann’s
separation between mathematical and logical construction left no room for this. His deci-
sion to regard analytic numbers as fictions introduced to express relations holding between
natural numbers was consistent with this position.
THE FOUNDATIONS OF ARITHMETIC: MULTIPLICATION
IN THE REINE ZAHLENLEHRE
Multiplication takes the natural numbers (already given by first-level counting) as arbi-
trary given signs. According to the definition of arithmetical synthesis, this is only possible
if the numbers used in this way are taken as equal. This can be done either by taking any
numbers as equal, that is, by ignoring their numerical value and taking them as “Zahlen
u¨berhaupt,” or by taking them as “fixed numbers [bestimmte Zahlen].” In the latter case,
the concrete numbers have to be numerically equal. The first alternative leads to counting
distinct numbers as equal, and the outcome is not a new arithmetical operation but simply
a trivial result telling us how many numbers we have considered. This is simply first-level
counting [17, 13]. The second option, on the contrary, leads to a new level of counting
(called second-level counting) and to multiplication.
Take some equal numbers, say 2, 2, 2, 2. Ignore their value and connect them 2&2&2&2.
This can be counted as a whole and expressed by the “multiplicative connection [multiplica-
tive Verbindung]” 4 ¢ 2. The first factor is the active one, the “true number [die eigentliche
Zahl]” the multiplicator or the “counting number [za¨hlende Zahl],” whereas the second one
is the passive, the multiplicand. The multiplicator is a second-level number, whereas the
multiplicand is a first-level number. Basically, Grassmann described 4 in its capacity as a
second-level number as a kind of function 4: IN! IN; 4(x)D x&x&x&x D 4 ¢ x , for any
x 2 IN. In this situation, 4 is the multiplicator and x the multiplicand. It is important to note
that according to Grassmann’s interpretation, as far as multiplication is concerned, the first
term has to be a number whereas the nature of the second is not important. In this way,
although Grassmann only spoke of the multiplication of natural numbers, his account of
it was more general and could be assimilated to what in contemporary algebra is called
multiplication between a scalar and a vector.
CONTINUOUS SYNTHESIS AND MULTIPLICATION IN GEOMETRY
In contrast to arithmetic, which is defined as synthesis as equal and discrete, geometry
is defined as synthesis as equal and continuous. The outcome, or, as Grassmann put it, the
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product, of geometric synthesis is an intensive aggregate. As we have seen, Grassmann did
not accept the possibility of continuous generation in combinatorics so that such an inten-
sive aggregate could only be intensive (or continuous) magnitude. The distinction between
discrete and continuous synthesis was characterized in terms of the relation between the
parts of the final aggregate and the aggregate taken as a whole. In the case of continuous
synthesis, both the parts and the whole were generated through one and the same act of con-
struction. Neither the part nor the whole preceded the other. Rather, the generative act of syn-
thesis produced them simultaneously. All this can be seen from Grassmann’s definition of
continuous synthesis given above. Since the Zahlenlehre focused on arithmetic, however,
Grassmann did not give many details concerning continuous synthesis. In addition to the def-
inition of continuous synthesis, the Zahlenlehre contained one more passage on this subject:
Wenn wir ... die Raumgro¨ßen synthetisch construiren wollen, so ist offenbar, daß wir von der absoluten
ra¨umlichen Grenze, dem Punkte ausgehen mu¨ssen; die erste geometrische Construktion ist dann das
Ziehen einer geraden Linie, welche die Geometrie unmittelbar fordert, durch die Fortbewegung des
Punktes. Nun leuchtet sogleich ein, daß, wenngleich diese Construktion von ganz eigentu¨mlicher Art
ist, worauf eben die besondere Natur der Geometrie beruht, sie doch sogleich in ihrem Beginnen in ihrer
ganzen Eigentu¨mlichkeit gegeben sei, und daß die ganze Construktion der Linie in einer Synthesis des
Gleichartigen bestehe, wodurch sie eben ein Gegenstand der Mathematik wird. [17, 4]
Here, Grassmann characterized mathematical synthesis corresponding to the couple
continuous–equal as movement. He presented continuous generation and multiplication
in geometry in his 1824 Raumlehre.
This work contained a short section in which Grassmann defined a rectangle as the product
of length and height. His understanding of the geometric product and of the relation between
the geometrical and the arithmetical product comes out best in the following passage:
Das Rechteck ist eigentlich das wahre geometrische Produkt, und die Construktion desselben, ... die
eigentlich geometrische Multiplikation. Nimmt man den Begriff des Produkts na¨mlich in seiner reinsten
und allgemeinsten Bedeutung, so bezeichnet er das Ergebnis einer Construktion, welches aus einem
schon Erzeugten (Construirten) auf gleiche Weise hervorgeht, als dieses Erzeugte aus den urspru¨nglich
Erzeugenden, und die Multiplikation ist so nur eine Construktion in einer ho¨hern Potenz. In der Geometrie
ist der Punkt das urspru¨nglich Erzeugende; aus ihm geht durch jene Construktion die Linie hervor.
Machen wir die begrenzte Linie (als das durch die erste Construktion Erzeugte) zur Grundlage einer
neuen Construktion, indem wir sie auf gleiche Weise behandeln, wie vorher den Punkt, so entsteht das
Rechteck. Das Rechteck entsteht also aus der Linie eben so, wie die Linie aus dem Punkte entstand.
So verha¨lt es sich nun auch in der Zahlenlehre. Hier ist das urspru¨nglich Erzeugende die Einheit,
welche in Hinsicht auf die Zahl als schlechthin gegeben angesehen werden muß. Aus dieser geht durch
das Za¨hlen (die arithmetische Construktion) die Zahl hervor. Macht man diese nunmehr gebildete Zahl
zur Grundlage eines neuen Za¨hlens, indem man sie an die Stelle der Einheit setzt, so erha¨lt man die
arithmetische Verbindung zur Multiplikation, welche also nichts anders ist, als eine Zahl auf ho¨herer
Stufe, eine Zahl, deren Einheit auch eine Zahl ist. So ko¨nnte man sagen, das Rechteck sei eine (begr.)
Linie, bei der an die Stelle des erzeugenden Punkts auch eine (begr.) Linie getreten sei. Man wu¨rde dann
die beiden vorstehenden Sa¨tze auch so fassen ko¨nnen: Rechtecke sind die geometrischen Produkte aus
Grundseite und Ho¨he, und verhalten sich wie die arithmetischen. [16, 194–195]
Here, we find an analogy between the multiplication of natural numbers and his geometric
product concept. This may suggest an analogy between discrete and continuous synthe-
sis as well as the possibility of considering a general concept of multiplication of which
arithmetical and geometric multiplication would be particular cases. Yet Grassmann did not
go this far. As we have seen, in the Zahlenlehre, he chose to distinguish sharply between
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discrete and continuous synthesis. Grassmann’s discussion of the possibility of considering
a general multiplication concept was somewhat more complex (see below).
THE STATUS OF ALGEBRA IN GRASSMANN’S ZAHLENLEHRE
Beginning in the 17th century, the ontological status of algebra has constantly puzzled
and divided the mathematical world. Algebra proved a powerful tool for solving problems
in various fields of mathematics, most notably geometry and mechanics. At the same time,
it was not entirely clear whether algebra had an object in the sense in which arithmetic
and geometry were thought to have one. Most regarded algebra as a kind of arithmetic
with letters, that is, as a mere symbolic expression of arithmetic (such a position was still
defended by Otto Ho¨lder in 1899).33 According to this view, the semantics of algebra
cannot be determined or even expressed from within; whatever objects it may refer to must
be supplied from the outside.
In the Zahlenlehre, Grassmann distinguished between algebra as “computing with let-
ters [Buchstabenrechnung]” and algebra as “general theory of magnitudes [allgemeine
Gro¨ßenlehre].” As Buchstabenrechnung, algebra is “nur eine besondere Methode, Regeln
der Zahlenverknu¨pfung schematisch darzustellen” [17, 8]. As allgemeine Gro¨ßenlehre, it
expresses the formal laws characterizing the operations that can be performed on any “ab-
stract magnitudes [Gro¨ßen u¨berhaupt].” As Buchstabenrechnung, it is a generalization of
arithmetic whereas, as allgemeine Gro¨ßenlehre, it is treated independently of arithmetic
and of any other individual mathematical discipline [17, 8–9]. Under the latter interpreta-
tion, the symbolic constructions of algebra could appear as the foundation of the individual
mathematical disciplines. If this were so, then these disciplines might come to be seen as
distinct models of algebra. The question is: How did Grassmann choose between these two
options?34 His classification of the three allowed synthetic operations—addition, multipli-
cation, and exponentiation—sheds light on this. The question becomes which of them (if
any!) can be performed on abstract magnitudes and therefore should belong to the allge-
meine Gro¨ßenlehre and which cannot.
Grassmann approached this issue in the following way. In his view, it was obvious that
all synthetic operations could be performed inside arithmetic.35 Therefore, it remained to
take the arithmetical operations one by one and to see whether they applied to geometric
magnitudes as well, and then to establish whether those operations that could be performed
in both disciplines were truly general (i.e., if they could be performed on abstract magni-
tudes) or if, on the contrary, they essentially depended on the specific type of mathematical
synthesis involved in each discipline.
33 As is well known, John Wallis argued that arithmetic gives the basic mathematical ontology. Against him,
Isaac Barrow attributed this to geometry. Finally, Francois Vie`te, Andre´ Tacquet, and to some extent George
Berkeley assigned priority to algebraic formalism.
34 Grassmann’s distinction between algebra as Buchstabenrechnung and algebra as general theory of magnitudes
is closely related to his sharp distinction between synthesis and analysis or, in Grassmann’s terms, between
mathematical synthesis (based on product construction) and logical, abstract synthesis (in which there is separation
of concept and concrete embodiment).
35 It is also tacitly assumed that there cannot be geometric operations of a completely different nature from these
three. Grassmann considered only operations that could be performed on magnitudes. Combinatorial operations
were therefore not at all taken into account in his discussion of algebraic operations.
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According to Grassmann, exponentiation made sense only in arithmetic, so this operation
was a purely arithmetical one. No justification was provided [17, 8–9]. The situation with
multiplication is, however, more complicated. As we have seen, Grassmann recognized
the existence of two types of multiplication: arithmetical multiplication, which is seen
as depending on arithmetical synthesis, and geometric multiplication, which is seen as
determined by geometric synthesis. On the one hand, one may express this by saying
that multiplication has two models, or two distinct interpretations in distinct mathematical
theories. This would amount to the recognition of multiplication as a general operation that
could be performed on the uninterpreted forms of algebra. On the other hand, one may claim
that, since in each case multiplication essentially depends on a different type of synthesis
(discrete in arithmetic and continuous in geometry), there is no general multiplication
operation. Despite the fact that Grassmann insisted on the analogy between the account of
multiplication in arithmetic and in geometry, he claimed that it made no sense to speak of
a general multiplication operation to be performed on abstract magnitudes.
This conclusion is determined by Grassmann’s commitment to the following two ideas.
First, he spoke of mathematical synthesis, but at the same time, only recognized three
distinct types of mathematical synthesis. This led to the rejection of general, mathematical
magnitudes and hence of any operations that would depend on the recognition of such
magnitudes. Second, the algebraic symbolism was assigned a different nature than that
used in the three fundamental mathematical disciplines. In a revealing passage Grassmann
wrote:
Zuerst kann sich ... die allgemeine Gro¨ßenlehre in der Abstraction von jeder besonderen Art von Gro¨ßen
nicht halten, ohne bald allen sicheren Boden zu verlieren. Auch der geu¨bte Denker verlangt von Zeit
zu Zeit einen Ruhepunkt, wo das in der Abstraction zerschwebende sich wieder zu einem gestalteten
Produkte sammle, und so eine Befriedigung gewa¨hre, bei der eine Reihe als geschlossen betrachtet, und
wo das gewonnene Resultat als Ausgangspunkt fu¨r eine neue Reihe dienen kann. [17, 8]
Such a “Ruhepunkt” can be found only in the products of genuine mathematical synthesis
and not in the symbolic representations of algebra as such. Algebra therefore appears
as a mere universal language in which the relations between the various mathematical
magnitudes can be expressed. Mathematical construction generates products, that is, abstract
objects, material embodiments of thinking. Like logical synthesis, algebra does not lead
to specifically algebraic products, and therefore it depends on the products generated by
mathematical construction [17, 8].
As noted above, Grassmann claimed that addition relied on colligations, such as 2C 3D 5,
which involved a dualism between the signifier and the signified, between form and content.
The presence of this dualism indicated that addition was not genuinely synthetic. Addition
was therefore considered a more general, logical operation (despite of the fact that he
claimed that, as far as mathematics is concerned, arithmetic was synthetic). Grassmann
described the relation between arithmetical addition and logical addition as follows:
[Addition] ist na¨mlich nicht bloß eine arithmetische, sondern die allgemeine Synthesis des Verstandes
u¨berhaupt, oder die allgemeine logische Verknu¨pfung, nur auf die Zahl angewandt. Wie na¨mlich Subject
und Pra¨dicat in einem Satze in Beziehung auf ihren Inhalt verknu¨pft werden, so kann man eine Zahl
mit einer anderen in Beziehung auf ihren Inhalt verknu¨pfen, und diese Verknu¨pfung ist nicht an sich,
sondern insofern eine mathematische, als dieser Inhalt durch die mathematische Synthesis ... in die
zu verknu¨pfenden Gegensta¨nde hineingelegt ist. Das Aneinandersetzen zweier Linien, zweier Fla¨chen,
oder Ko¨rper, die Hinzufu¨gung eines Merkmals zu einem Begriffe, der dasselbe noch nicht enthielt, ist
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FIG. 4. Justus Grassmann’s classification of the synthetic operations.
an sich der na¨mliche Act, als die Verknu¨pfung zweier Zahlen zur Addition, nur daß er dort in Beziehung
auf Begriffe und ra¨umliche Gro¨ßen, hier auf Zahlgro¨ßen angewandt ist.[17, 16–7]
So far we have seen that Grassmann assigned exponentiation a genuinely arithmetical nature
and addition a logical nature. Because of this as a general operation, addition was assigned to
the general theory of forms, whereas exponentiation, as a genuinely arithmetical operation,
was assigned to Buchstabenrechnung. Furthermore, we have seen that multiplication, which,
in contrast to addition, was regarded as a genuinely mathematical operation, was split
between arithmetic and geometry so that it could not belong to algebra understood as a
general theory of forms.36 Because of this, the status of multiplication remained in a sense
unsatisfactory since it could not be fitted in a satisfactory way in his classification frame.
This might be seen as an indication that something was wrong with the entire classification.
Yet Grassmann avoided this conclusion by arguing that multiplication was a genuinely
arithmetical operation and that, therefore, it belonged to Buchstabenrechnung. Figure 4
captures Grassmann’s classification of the operations that can be performed on magnitudes.
Due to this classification, algebra is divided into the general theory of magnitudes, which
in the end is described as a symbolic expression of a logical operation (addition), and
Buchstabenrechnung, which is seen as a general symbolic expression of the specifically
arithmetical operations (multiplication and exponentiation).
This discussion also has significant consequences for Grassmann’s account of the issue of
the axiomatization of arithmetic. He illustrated his conception by discussing the justification
of the commutative law for multiplication. One might be inclined to adopt a law such as
this one as an axiom inside arithmetic. Grassmann explicitly excluded this option because
he claimed that arithmetic is synthetic, and this means that the ultimate justification for
the general laws governing the arithmetical operations has to be arithmetical synthesis (in
36 Unlike George Boole, and unlike his sons Hermann and Robert Grassmann, Justus Grassmann did not
recognize multiplication as a logical operation.
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this Grassmann followed Schelling). Therefore, laws such as the commutative law must be
proved.
The next question is what such a proof might look like. It certainly cannot be a for-
mal algebraic proof of the kind advocated by Legendre [17, 21]. For a proof of abD ba,
Grassmann referred the reader to a proof contained in Klu¨gel’s dictionary [17, 21]. Klu¨gel’s
proof is basically this: According to the definition of multiplication, ab can be seen as
meaning a times b. So, exhibit a representation of a times b (understood as a rows of b
objects each) in the following way:
⁄ ⁄ ⁄ ⁄ ⁄
⁄ ⁄ ⁄ ⁄ ⁄
⁄ ⁄ ⁄ ⁄ ⁄
⁄ ⁄ ⁄ ⁄ ⁄
We recognize that this diagram represents either ab or ba according to the way in which it
is interpreted so that abD ba [25, 3 : 647].37
In contrast to the general theory of magnitudes, which does not depend on arithmetic or
on any other mathematical discipline, Buchstabenrechnung depends on arithmetic for the
development and justification of its statement. Therefore, in this case, arithmetic represents
the foundation of Buchstabenrechnung and not the other way around:
die Algebra und die Analysis setzen die Arithmetik schlechterdings voraus, indem ihre Schemata in
jedem aus Factoren zusammengesetzten Gliede, wenigstens bis auf Eins, Zahlen bedeuten mu¨ssen. Es
ist daher durchaus untunlich, die Buchstabenrechnung, und was mit ihr zusammenha¨ngt, als allgemeine
Gro¨ßenlehre der Arithmetik voranzuschicken.[17, 8–9]
To adopt algebraic laws as a formal foundation for arithmetic would mean to place
Buchstabenrechnung taken as a general theory of forms ahead of arithmetic. This would
not be acceptable.
CONCLUSION
Grassmann’s foundational ideas were developed in an environment permeated by intense
foundational debates shaped by the clash between two fundamental, opposite directions:
(i) the search for a basic, irreducible mathematical ontology and (ii) the search for ways
of enlarging the basic ontology to include higher level entities and operations obtained
through hypostatic abstraction. This tension came to the fore with particular strength in
the Schelling–Kant debate over the nature of representation and construction in geometry,
arithmetic, and algebra, and over the relation between construction and the axiomatic method
in mathematics.38 The two directions may be characterized respectively as a bottom-up and
a top-down approach to the foundations of mathematics.39
37 One may object to this by saying that what Klu¨gel really has proved is not that abD ba but that 4 ¢ 5D 5 ¢ 4.
Klu¨gel’s dictionary gave no answer to this question. An answer can be found in Grassmann’s paper. There, he
wrote that in the proof of abD ba, the numerical identity 4 ¢ 5D 5 ¢ 4 plays the part that is played in geometric
proof by a particular pictorial representation [17, 33]. If this practice is accepted in geometry, then a Klu¨gel-type
proof should be accepted in arithmetic.
38 This tension stood behind the distinction between contentual mathematics and metamathematics introduced
by David Hilbert, and the various debates caused by Hilbert’s ideas.
39 This terminology was suggested to me by Roland Fischer.
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Once the decision of admitting the possibility of an absolute bottom-up foundation for
mathematics is made, and Grassmann certainly did that, a way must be found to make a
clear distinction between primary, first-level and derived, second-level mathematical enti-
ties. Justus Grassmann relied on the distinction between external, mathematical and internal,
logical syntheses as the fundamental tool. He argued that the first-level mathematical enti-
ties belonging to the individual mathematical disciplines were generated through external
synthesis, whereas the second-level ones were generated through internal synthesis. How-
ever, the classification of the mathematical entities as belonging to the first or to the second
level is not straightforward. The difficulty involved in operating this kind of a sharp sepa-
ration emerges with particular force in Grassmann’s distinction between the logical and the
constructive moments in geometry; in his treatments of zero, of, say, ¡2, of multiplication
and addition, and of algebra and arithmetic; and in his account of the magnitudes.
I close my study with a brief comparison between Justus Grassmann’s foundational ideas
and those developed by Hermann Grassmann in 1844. I focus on the account of addition
and on the relation between the allgemeine Gro¨ßenlehre and the individual mathematical
disciplines (arithmetic in particular) in the work of the two authors.40
Addition has a somewhat unusual status in Justus Grassmann’s work. On the one hand, it
is considered a logical operation because it involves signs such as 1, 2, 3, 4, : : :, which are not
products of mathematical synthesis. On the other hand, addition depends on the possibility
of substituting the previous signs with genuine products of mathematical synthesis such as
the elements of the sequence /, //, ///, : : : and of recombining these latter strings of signs
in external synthesis. Because of this, addition is ultimately considered to be a synthetic
operation. So, in a sense, we are confronted with two operations of addition here: a logical
operation, which as such belongs to the allgemeine Gro¨ßenlehre, and a synthetic operation
applied to mathematical objects, the laws of which are determined by the mathematical
synthesis of natural number. One might then conclude that Grassmann recognized both an
analytic operation of addition inside general algebra and one or several synthetic operations
of addition in the individual mathematical disciplines. But as I have shown, Grassmann did
not admit the possibility of taking the symbolic constructions of algebra, the operations
performed on them, and their proprieties as genuine mathematical operations, having as
it were a hypothetical status with respect to the operations of the same names and with
similar proprieties but which, instead, belong to the individual mathematical disciplines. In
the end, as far as mathematics is concerned, the only thing that matters is the properties of
the operations as determined by mathematical synthesis.
In the first edition of the Ausdehnungslehre, Hermann Grassmann made a distinction sim-
ilar to his father’s between what he called “General Theory of Forms [allgemeine Formen-
lehre]” (GTF) and his four individual mathematical disciplines (arithmetic, combinatorics,
calculus, and the calculus of extension). Hermann Grassmann treated each operation con-
sidered by him both as an abstract operation performed on abstract “forms” at the level of
the GTF and, at the same time, as an operation performed in various ways inside each of the
individual mathematical disciplines, and determined by the particular type of mathematical
synthesis on which each discipline is based.
In the case of addition, for instance, just like his father, Hermann Grassmann proceeded
by introducing it twice: as an operation performed on a set of unspecified forms (symbolic
40 I have discussed the other issues previously.
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constructions within the GTF), and satisfying what, in modern terms, are described as the
axioms of a commutative group structure [13, 1.1: 38ff.]. In my view, Hermann Grassmann’s
formulations indicate clearly that, as a part of the GTF, the properties of addition are judged
to be hypothetical and independent of each other and that, again at the level of the GTF,
addition has nothing to do with the addition of numbers or of any other particular type of
magnitudes.41 Against this background, it can be said that basically, Hermann Grassmann
developed the GTF as an axiomatic theory in its own right, in the modern sense of term.
What Hermann Grassmann did not do was adopt the GTF as an instrument for generating
the individual mathematical disciplines. To illustrate this, let me consider the example of
addition once more, only this time taken as a part of arithmetic.42 Hermann Grassmann
regarded it as based on the combination discrete synthesis and synthesis as equal, which he
described in terms similar to those used by his father in 1827 [13, I.1: 26]. He also insisted
that the laws of the GTF and the general properties of the operations proved at the level
of the GTF could be applied to arithmetic only after it had been proved that the operation
called “addition” in arithmetic was an addition in the sense defined in the GTF, that is,
after the axioms of abstract addition had been proved to be arithmetical theorems [13, I.1:
40–41]. On this Hermann Grassmann did not go significantly beyond the approach of his
father.43
On the whole, Hermann Grassmann’s account of the operations and of the relation be-
tween arithmetic and algebra represented an important step in the direction of a top-down
approach to mathematics. He did not go that far, however. He retained the opposition between
construction and axiomatization in mathematics emphasized by Schelling and defended by
his father, Justus Grassmann.
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